Olympic and Paralympic Games
The Olympic Games Framework for the 2024 Olympiad, opens in a new tab states: "Ensuring the safe and peaceful celebration of the Olympic Games is the responsibility of the relevant authorities of the host country, through coordinated planning and organisation with the OCOG [Organising Committee for the Olympic Games]. The host country authorities should work closely with the host city, OCOG and NOC [National Olympic Committee] to provide all the required services, including all financial, planning and operational aspects, to ensure the safety and security of all those involved in the Olympic Games."
Planning and delivery of security should involve a multi-agency strategy with all government ministries, law enforcement agencies, and other stakeholders involved. Typically these entities include the OCOG, the home affairs ministry, the ministry of defence, intelligence agencies, cyber-security agencies, the police, and immigration and/or customs agencies. The strategy should define the specific roles and responsibilities of each of the security stakeholders. Generally the OCOG takes responsibility for security inside the venue perimeter, whereas the police or other agencies take responsibility for security outside the perimeter.
It is important to minimise disruption to the normal running of the host city’s police and other security services while delivering a safe and secure event. When planning the security of the Olympic and Paralympic Games, it is important to screen and protect the entire supply chain of goods which requires close integration with the logistics department.
As part of the IOC Report of the Evaluation Commission for the Games of the 2020 Olympiad, opens in a new tab, the following covered security issues for the Tokyo bid: The National Government will assume ultimate operational and financial responsibility for Games security. Government agencies involved in security planning and operations will cover their own financial costs (underwritten by the National Government). Good coordination exists between all security agencies and Games command and control arrangements are clear with a single chain of command under the Cabinet-level “Tokyo Olympic Games Council”. The Superintendent General of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department (TMPD) will have overall operational command and would form an Olympic Security Command Centre coordinating the following bodies, all of which have submitted guarantees to the IOC:
- OCOG Security Department
- TMPD
- Japan Coast Guard
- Tokyo Fire Department
- Japan Self-Defence Forces
The Games plan involved over 50,000 security personnel, including 14,000 private security officers to be trained by the TMPD. The OCOG covered the cost of these security guards and venue security equipment. If additional security resources are required, the TMPD and the National Government will underwrite the costs for both the Olympic and the Paralympic Games. Venue designers and security departments will work closely together as part of the operational aspect of the Tokyo 2020 Security Protection Plan.
Resources and reading
- Cybersecurity stepped up for Paris 2024 Olympics, opens in a new tab, Philip Barker, Inside the Games, (14 December 2022). The team responsible for cybersecurity at the Paris 2024 Olympics have launched a series of exercises aimed at preventing a repetition of attacks at the Pyeongchang 2018 Winter Olympics through a programme of cyber malware dubbed "Olympic Destroyer."
- French Government restricts major festivals during Paris 2024 for security reasons, opens in a new tab, Patrick Burke, Inside the Games, (14 December 2022). Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin, Culture Minister Rima Abdul Malak and Sports and Olympic and Paralympic Games Minister Amélie Oudea-Castera have devised a four-stage plan for the staging of cultural events which would clash with Paris 2024. This includes a ban on major cultural, festive and sporting events requiring the deployment of mobile force units (UFMs) from the opening of the Olympic Village on July 18 until the end of the Olympics on August 11.
- Security preparations underway for Paris 2024, opens in a new tab, Christine Brown, Around the Rings, (26 October 2022). 35,000 guards will be deployed to help with the opening ceremony with a crowd of 600,000 expected both on the banks of the Seine and from street level up above.
- The Economics of Hosting the Olympic Games, opens in a new tab, James McBride, Melissa Manno, Council on Foreign Relations, (14 December 2021). The Olympics have evolved dramatically since the first modern games were held in 1896. In the second half of the twentieth century, both the costs of hosting and the revenue produced by the spectacle grew rapidly, sparking controversy over the burdens host countries shouldered. The 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo highlighted the ongoing debate over the costs and benefits of hosting such a mega-event, especially after the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic forced a year’s delay and sparked public opposition over going ahead with the festivities during a major outbreak. Operational costs make up a smaller but still significant chunk of hosts’ Olympics budget. Security costs have escalated quickly since the 9/11 attacks—Sydney spent $250 million in 2000 while Athens spent over $1.5 billion in 2004, and costs have remained between $1 billion and $2 billion since.
- The Tokyo Olympics are a cybersecurity success story, opens in a new tab, Dr. Brian Gant, Security Magazine, (17 August 2021). Over the course of these games, it’s become increasingly clear that the organizers did indeed exercise preventative measures and that despite the challenges and limitations of holding an Olympics during a pandemic, the Tokyo Olympics have been a real success story from a cybersecurity perspective. Organizers of all large-scale, televised sporting events—and indeed just all organizations in general—should look to this year’s games as a model to emulate.
- How Japan Has Prepared For Cybersecurity Threats At The Tokyo 2020, opens in a new tab, Henry Doyle, Forbes, (15 June 2021). Last October, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) identified cybersecurity as a priority area and announced plans to heavily invest to provide the best cybersecure environment for the games. However, the IOC noted that they would not be disclosing the specific details of their cybersecurity plan due to the nature of the topic.
- Terrorism and the Olympics: Sochi, Russia 2014, opens in a new tab,START: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism , (January 2014). Here we review patterns of terrorist activity in Russia between 1992 and 2012, in particular trends over time, geography, perpetrators, tactics, and targets. We also analyze terrorist attacks that have taken place during the Olympic Games in the host country, attacks indirectly related to the Olympic Games, and attacks targeting other major sporting events. Bearing in mind that the heightened profile of international sporting events might increase the likelihood of a terrorist attack while the heightened security and surveillance might decrease the likelihood of an attack, we evaluate general patterns of terrorism in Olympic host countries at the time of the Games, compared to the same time period the previous year. The analysis indicates that there is no consistent increase or decrease in the frequency of terrorist attacks during the Olympics, suggesting that efforts to reinforce security are generally effective at mitigating any potential threats that may exist.
- Olympics security bill: how it soared to more than £1bn, opens in a new tab, Nick Hopkins and Owen Gibson, The Guardian, (9 March 2012). Organising committee's failure to estimate number of staff needed at London 2012 venues set off panic in Westminster. Less than 12 months before the start of the Olympics, the event's organising committee, Locog, realised it had a problem. It had totally underestimated the number of staff needed for security, a miscalculation that became obvious when it began to inspect some of the completed arenas last August. Instead of 10,000 staff at the 34 Olympic venues, Locog stated at least 20,000 would be needed, and probably more. And the committee was not entirely sure where these extras would come from.
- Special Issue: Terrorism and Sport: A Global Perspective, opens in a new tab. American Behavioral Scientist, Volume 60(9), (August 2016). The articles in this volume offer insights on the intersection of terrorism and sports, by presenting a wide, diverse picture of this phenomenon. The six articles explore this topic from a variety of perspectives, including security, sociology, media and public relations, and the political, ideological, and psychological aspects of sport and terror.
- Terrorism and Security at the Olympics: Empirical Trends and Evolving Research Agendas, opens in a new tab. Spaaij R, The International Journal of the History of Sport, Volume 33(4), pp.451-468, (2016). This paper provides an empirical analysis of Olympic-related terrorism in the period 1968–2014 and suggests the need to bring state terrorism into the analysis of terrorism at the Olympics. Additionally, draws attention to both intended and unanticipated security legacies of the Olympics, including the wider social implications of Olympic security operations.
- Surveillance and securitization: A forgotten Sydney Olympic legacy, opens in a new tab, Toohey, K., Taylor, T., International Review for the Sociology of Sport, Volume 47(3), pp.324-337, (2012). Uses the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, the last Olympic Games held before 9/11, as a case study to examine how Olympic security measures were implemented before and during the Games and how some of these have remained as an Olympic legacy in the post-9/11 era.
- London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy, opens in a new tab, UK Home Office, (March 2011). This document, first published in July 2009, set out the vision, aim, and objectives for a single Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy for the Government, the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG), the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), the police service, and all other key delivery agencies.
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